This essay considers some prescriptions that are currently popular regarding exchange rate regimes: a general movement toward floating, a general movement toward fixing, or a general movement toward either extreme and away from the middle. The whole spectrum from fixed to floating is covered (including basket pegs, crawling pegs, and bands), with special attention to currency boards and dollarization. One overall theme is that the appropriate exchange rate regime varies depending on the specific circumstances of the country in question (which includes the classic optimum currency area criteria, as well as some newer criteria related to credibility) and depending on the circumstances of the time period in question (which includes the problem of successful exit strategies). Latin American interest rates are seen to be more sensitive to US interest rates when the country has a loose dollar peg than when it has a tight peg. It is also argued that such relevant country characteristics as income correlations and openness can vary over time, and that the optimum currency area criterion is accordingly endogenous.
1999, a project that has gone more smoothly than most American economists forecast as recently as a few years ago.
I want to make a point stronger than the easy one that no single currency regime is a panacea. Rather my overall theme is that no single currency regime is best for all countries, and that even for a given country it may be that no single currency regime is best for all time. This lecture will also consider the claim that countries are increasingly pushed to choose between the polar cases of free float and rigid peg, with the intermediate regimes no longer tenable.
Balancing the Advantages of Fixed vs. Flexible Exchange Rates
But let's start with the easy point. Neither pure floating nor currency boards sweep away all the problems that come with modern globalized financial markets. Central to the economists' creed is that life always involves tradeoffs. Countries have to trade off the advantages of more exchange rate stability against the advantages of more flexibility. Ideally, they would pick the degree of flexibility that optimizes with respect to this tradeoff. Optimization often, though not always, involves an "interior solution."
The Flexibility-continuum of Exchange Rate Regimes "Fixed vs. floating" is an oversimplified dichotomy. There is in fact a continuum of flexibility, along which it is possible to place most exchange rate arrangements. There are nine, starting with the most rigid arrangement, and becoming increasingly flexible as we go: 1) Currency union: Here the currency that circulates domestically is literally the same as that circulating in one or more major neighbors or partners. Examples include Panama and some East Caribbean islands (the dollar) and European Monetary Union (the euro). Dollarization has recently been proposed in several Latin American countries. The motivation is to get the maximum credibility for inflation-resistant monetary policy by adopting the strongest commitment. Even a currency union can be reversed if desired (witness the Czech and Slovak korunas, whose separation was velvety smooth, and the Former Soviet Union, whose separation was considerably rougher). But it is the firmest commitment to a fixed exchange rate possible.
2) Currency board. The current fad is sometimes sold as credibility in a bottle. Examples include Argentina, Hong Kong, and some Eastern European countries. A later section of this paper defines and discusses currency boards at greater length..
3) "Truly fixed" exchange rate. Members of the francophone West African and Central African currency unions fix to the French franc, while many countries fix to the dollar. 4) Adjustable peg: "Fixed but adjustable" was the description of exchange rate pegs under the Bretton Woods regime. Most countries that declare themselves fixed, in fact periodically undergo realignments, if they do not change regimes altogether. 1 1 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) report that only six major economies with open capital markets, in addition to a number of very small economies had maintained a fixed exchange rate for five years or more, as of 1995. Klein and Marion (1994) report that the mean duration of pegs among Western Hemisphere countries is about 10 months 5) Crawling peg: In high-inflation countries, the peg can be regularly reset in a series of mini-devaluations, as often as weekly. A prominent example is Chile. In one approach, which retains a bit of the nominal-anchor function of an exchange rate target --the path is preannounced. The rate of crawl may be set deliberately lower than the rate of forecasted inflation, in an effort by the country to work its way gradually out of the inflation cycle, as in the tablita of southern cone countries in the late 1970s. In another approach, which gives up on fighting inflation and opts instead to live with it, the exchange rate is indexed to the price level, in an attempt to keep the real exchange rate steady. 6) Basket peg: The exchange rate is fixed in terms of a weighted basket of currencies instead of any one major currency, an approach that makes sense for countries with trade patterns that are highly diversified geographically, as many in Asia. In theory, there is little reason why this arrangement cannot be as rigid as an exchange rate fixed to one currency. In practice, most countries that announce a basket peg keep the weights secret, and adjust the weights or the level sufficiently often that the formula cannot be precisely inferred. An exception is the handful of countries that peg to the SDR. 7) Target zone or band: The authorities pledge to intervene when the exchange rate hits pre-announced margins on either side of a central parity. Example: The Exchange Rate Mechanism or ERM, founded in 1979, according to which a number of European countries followed a range of plus-or-minus 2 1/4 percent (still maintained by Denmark). Of course, if the range is sufficiently narrow, a target zone approaches a fixed rate (such as the 1% width that ruled under the Bretton Woods system, and that is still the official definition of a fixed peg); if sufficiently wide it approaches a float (such as the 15% width of the ERM after 1993, still maintained by Greece). 2 8) Managed float: Also known as a "dirty float," it is defined as a readiness to intervene in the foreign exchange market, without defending any particular parity. Most intervention is intended to lean against the wind --buying the currency when it is rising (or is already high) and selling when it is falling (or is already low). In a stylized version, a managed floater responds to a one percent fluctuation in demand for his currency by accommodating to the extent of varying the supply of the currency by K percent, and letting the rest show up in the price --the exchange rate. When K is close to 1, the exchange rate is fixed, when it is close to 0 the currency is 
The Hypothesis of the Vanishing Intermediate Regime
Non-ideologues look at recent history and agree that both free floating and rigid fixity have flaws. Nevertheless many increasingly hypothesize that intermediate regimes seem no longer tenable. The currently-fashionable view is that countries are being pushed to choose between the extremes of truly fixed and truly floating.
3 For example, Summers (1999) :
"There is no single answer, but in light of recent experience what is perhaps becoming increasingly clear --and will probably be increasingly reflected in the advice that the international community offers --is that in a world of freely flowing capital there is shrinking scope for countries to occupy the middle ground of fixed but adjustable pegs. As we go forward from the events of the past eighteen months, I expect that countries will be increasingly wary about committing themselves to fixed exchange rates, whatever the temptations these may offer in the short run, unless they are also prepared to dedicate policy wholeheartedly to their support and establish extra-ordinary domestic safeguards to keep them in place."
There are understandable reasons for this view. Nevertheless, the generalization is in danger of being overdone. The original references on the vanishing intermediate regime are Eichengreen (1994 Eichengreen ( , 1998 . In the context of the European ERM, the crisis of 1992 and band-widening of 1993 suggested to some that a gradual transition to EMU, where the width of the target zone was narrowed in steps, might not be the best way to proceed after all (Crockett, 1994) . Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) concluded, ".A careful examination of the genesis of speculative attacks suggests that even broad-band systems in the current EMS style pose difficulties, and that there is little, if any, comfortable middle ground between floating rates and the adoption by countries of a common currency." The lesson that "the best way to cross a chasm is in a single jump" was seemingly borne out by the successful leap from wide bands to EMU in 1998-99. perhaps with good reason. half is allowed to be reflected in the exchange rate.
Figure 1 is a simple schematic illustration of the impossible trinity. Each of the three sides has an attraction --the allures of monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and full financial integration. One can attain any pair of attributes --the first two at the apex marked "capital controls", the second two at the vertex marked "monetary and financial union", or the other two at the vertex marked "pure float." But one cannot be on all three sides simultaneously.
The general trend of financial integration has pushed most countries toward the lower part of the graph. If one is at the bottom leg of the triangle, the choice is narrowed down to a simple states of the U.S., whether the links are measured by prices or quantities of trade. High on the list of reasons why integration seems to be so much higher between provinces within a federation such as Canada than between countries is the fact that the provinces share a common currency.
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Of the advantages of fixed exchange rates, academic economists tend to focus most on the nominal anchor for monetary policy. The argument is that there can be an inflationary bias when monetary policy is set with full discretion. A central bank that wants to fight inflation can commit more credibly by fixing the exchange rate, or even giving up its currency altogether.
Workers, firm managers, and others who set wages and prices then perceive that inflation will be low in the future, because the currency peg will prevent the central bank from expanding even if it wanted to (without soon jeopardizing the viability of the exchange rate peg). When workers and firm managers have low expectations of inflation, they set their wages and prices accordingly. The result is that the country is able to attain a lower level of inflation, for any given level of output. This is an argument why countries like Italy, Spain, and Portugal, which had high inflation rates in the 1970s, were eager to tie their currencies to those of Germany and the rest of the EMS countries. In essence, they hoped to import the inflation-fighting credibility 9 McCallum (1995) for a quantity-based measure of trade integration, and Engel and Rogers (1994, 1997) for a price-based measure. The most direct test yet of the effect of a common currency on bilateral trade is Rose (1999) .
of the Bundesbank. The nominal anchor argument of course presupposes that one is pegging to a hard currency, one that exhibits strong monetary discipline. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, most of the 15 newly independent states wisely reached the judgment that the Russian rouble did not offer a good nominal anchor. The strength of the argument for basing monetary policy on an exchange rate target will also depend on what alternative nominal anchors might be available (money supply, nominal income, or price level).
The advantages of a flexible exchange rate can all be grouped under one major property:
it allows the country to pursue independent monetary policy. The argument in favor of monetary independence, instead of constraining monetary policy by the fixed exchange rate, is the classic argument for discretion, instead of rules. When the economy is hit by a disturbance, such as a shift in worldwide demand away from the goods it produces, the government would like to be able to respond, so that the country does not go into recession. Under fixed exchange rates, monetary policy is always diverted, at least to some extent, to dealing with the balance of payments. Under the combination of fixed exchange rates and complete integration of financial markets, which characterizes EMU, monetary policy becomes completely powerless. Under these conditions, the domestic interest rate is tied to the foreign interest rate. An expansion in the money supply has no effect: the new money flows out of the country, via a balance of payments deficit, just as quickly as it is created. In the face of an adverse disturbance, the country must simply live with the effects. After the fall in demand, for example, the recession may last until wages and prices are bid down, or until some other automatic mechanism of adjustment takes hold. By freeing up the currency, on the other hand, the country can respond to a recession by means of monetary expansion and depreciation of the currency. This stimulates demand for domestic products and returns the economy to desired levels of employment and output more rapidly than would the case under the automatic mechanisms of adjustment on which a fixed-rate country must rely.
The argument for stabilizing the exchange rate is sometimes buttressed by reference to an increasingly evident disadvantage of free floating: a tendency toward volatility that does not always derive from macroeconomic fundamentals, including occasional speculative bubbles (possibly rational, possibly not) and crashes. However the argument for flexibility is corrspondingly sometimes buttressed by reference to an increasingly evident disadvantage of pegging: a tendency toward borrowers' effectively-unhedged exposure in foreign currency (possibly rational, possibly not 10 ), ending badly in speculative attacks and multiple equilibrium.
Overvaluation and excessive volatility are possible in either regime.
Which factors are likely to dominate, the advantages of fixed exchange rates or the advantages of floating? There is no one right answer for all countries. The answer must depend, in large part, on characteristics of the country in question. If the country is subject to many external disturbances, for example, such as fluctuations in foreigners' eagerness to buy domestic goods and domestic assets (perhaps arising from business cycle fluctuations among the country's neighbors), then it is more likely to want to float its currency. In this way it can insulate itself from the foreign disturbances, to some degree. On the other hand, if the country is subject to many internal disturbances, then it is more likely to want to peg its currency.
10 Many who have recently argued for floating on these grounds verge on implying that it would be beneficial to introduce gratuitous volatility into the exchange rate, to discourage unhedged borrowing in foreign currency.
No Single Regime is Right for All Countries: The Optimum Currency Area
Many of the country characteristics that are most important to the fixed-vs.-floating question are closely related to the size and openness of the country. This observation brings us to the theory of the Optimum Currency Area.
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Definition of Optimum Currency Area
Countries that are highly integrated with each other, with respect to trade and other economic relationships, are more likely to constitute an optimum currency area. An optimum currency area is a region for which it is optimal to have its own currency and its own monetary policy. This definition, though in common use, may be too broad to be of optimum usefulness. currencies. Even to the extent that corner solutions are appropriate for given countries, the optimal geographic coverage for a common currency is likely to be intermediate in size: larger than a city and smaller than the entire planet.
The Integration Parameters of the OCA Criteria
11 A recent survey is Tavlas (1992). The issues are also reviewed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) .
12 Gravity estimates suggest that for every one percent increase in the size of a country's economy, its ratio of trade to GDP falls by about .3 percent. (Frankel, 1997.) Why does the OCA criterion depend on openness? The advantages of fixed exchange rates increase with the degree of economic integration, while the advantages of flexible exchange rates diminish. Recall the two big advantages of fixing the exchange rate that we identified above: (1) to reduce transactions costs and exchange rate risk that can discourage trade and investment, and (2) 14 Furthermore, the chief advantage of a floating exchange rate, the ability to pursue an independent monetary policy, is in many ways weaker for an economy that is highly integrated with its neighbors. This is because there are ways that such a country or region can cope with an adverse shock even in the absence of discretionary changes in macroeconomic policy. Consider first, as the criterion for openness, the marginal propensity to import. Variability in output under a fixed exchange rate is relatively low when the marginal propensity to import is high; openness acts as an automatic stabilizer.
Consider next, as the criterion of openness the ease of labor movement between the country in question and its neighbors. If the economy is highly integrated with its neighbors by this criterion, then workers may be able to respond to a local recession by moving across the border to get jobs, so there is less need for a local monetary expansion or devaluation.
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Of course the neighbor may be in recession at the same time. Romer (1993) . 15 Labor mobility was the criterion identified by Mundell (1961) , who originally introduced the concept of the optimum currency area.
16 Corden (1972) and Alesina and Grilli (1991) .
extent they pride their national sovereignty, they will not want to give up their national currency even if it is economically advantageous.
In part 5 of this study, we will focus particularly on two OCA criteria: the extent of trade among members of a given grouping, and the correlation of their incomes. The two axes in 
Corner Solutions Are Right for Some Countries
A popular hypothesis is that the world monetary system will feature fewer currencies in the coming decade than it does now. Small open countries (and perhaps not only these) will abandon their independent currencies --in favor of the firmest institutional constraints possible:
either a currency board, or outright monetary union with one of the major-currency countries.
One version of the hypothesis overlaps with the familiar claim that the world is breaking up into three blocs, one pegged to the dollar, one to the euro, and one to the yen.
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Currency Boards 17 We assume in this project that effective capital controls are not an option. Thus fixing the exchange rate implies abandoning the ability to set the interest rate independently.
18 The dollar and euro are looking somewhat more credible as bloc anchors than in the past. The yen much less so. (References are in Frankel and Wei, 1995.) A currency board is a monetary institution that only issues currency that is fully backed by foreign assets. Its principal attributes include the following:
• an exchange rate that is fixed not just by policy, but by law • a strong (even desperate) need to import monetary stability, due to either a history of hyperinflation, an absence of credible public institutions, or unusually large exposure to nervous international investors
• a desire for further close integration with a particular neighbor or trading partner (which has the added advantage of enhancing the political credibility of the commitment)
• an economy in which the foreign currency is already widely used 20
• access to an adequate level of reserves, 19 Similar lists are also offered by Williamson (1995) and Larrain and Velasco (1999) . 20 In a country that is already partially dollarized, devaluation is of little use. If many wages and prices are already tied to the dollar, they will simply rise by the same amount as the exchange rate. If liabilities are already denominated in dollars -and, in the case of international liabilities, foreign creditors generally insist on this --then devaluation may bankrupt domestic borrowers. Such initial conditions are discussed as criteria for dollarization by Calvo (1999) and Hausmann, Gavin, Pages-Serra, and Stein (1999) .
• rule of law, and
• a strong, well-supervised and regulated financial system, and
Currency board supporters have recently pushed for their wider use-in particular, for Indonesia, Russia, and Ukraine. Proclaiming a currency board does not automatically guarantee the credibility of the fixed rate peg. Little credibility is gained from putting an exchange rate peg into the law, in a country where laws are not heeded or are changed at will. A currency board is unlikely to be successful without the solid fundamentals of adequate reserves, fiscal discipline, and a strong and well-supervised financial system, in addition to the rule of law.
21
The Alternative of Dollarization Currency boards, which not long ago appeared a radical straightjacket, are now in some quarters deemed an insufficiently firm commitment. In January 1999, at the request of Argentina's President, the central bank submitted a report spelling out possible ways to complete the dollarization of that country, that is, to replace the peso fully with the dollar as the legal currency. This plan may well never come to fruition. The timing of the initiative --immediately after the downfall of the real in neighboring Brazil and in advance of a presidential election in Argentina --suggests possible short-term objectives: impressing contagion-prone speculators and stability-craving voters. Nevertheless, many Latin Americans are suddenly taking the dollarization alternative seriously, and at least one country, El Salvador, may actually go ahead.
And the fact that anyone would consider that talk of official dollarization might earn the 21 For a balanced evaluation, see Williamson (1995) .
Argentine President political popularity, rather than the reverse, is itself a sign of how much the world has changed.
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The reasons why most countries would not want to adopt the currency of the United States or any other foreign power as its own are clear. It is a total surrender of monetary independence. Also it adds the insult of surrendering a symbol of national political sovereignty, which is demonstrably important to most people. It is striking that, notwithstanding that in theory the boundaries of political units and optimal currency areas need not coincide, in practice they almost always do. In Israel in 1983, adverse popular reaction to the idea of dollarization was severe, and the finance minister who had proposed it resigned.
Yet, consider a country that already has demonstrated sufficient political support for monetary discipline to go as far as a currency board (and where the foreign currency already plays a large role in the economy). Is there anything further to be lost by going the rest of the way and giving up its currency altogether, beyond the symbolic loss of sovereignty?
The conventional interpretation would be that such a country still retains a degree of monetary independence that, though small, is not zero, and which it would be giving up if it were to dollarize fully. Argentina for example could always change the convertibility law if it wanted to, or short of that could switch its peg from the dollar to the euro, if US monetary policy disappointed. The interest rate differential consists primarily of a country premium, supplemented by a small currency premium. The country premium is compensation for perceived risk of default, measured as the Argentine dollar interest rate minus the U.S. treasury bill rate. The currency 24 The sample period runs from November 1994, when the dollar-denominated instrument is first available, to December 1998. If one responds to borderline serial correlation by taking first differences, the estimated coefficient drops to .88. For Hong Kong the estimated coefficient is just above one (though insignificantly so), regardless whether taking first differences or not. (For each currency considered, one cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit root. A need for first differences is conventionally indicated by this result, which, however, could be due to low power.) premium is compensation for perceived risk of change in exchange rate policy, measured as the Argentine peso interest rate minus the dollar-denominated Argentine interest rate. We used to think of countries' currency premiums and country premiums as independent factors. But we have learned that when there are lingering fears of devaluation, it affects not only the currency premium, but the country premium as well, because investors know that domestic banks and firms may not be able to service their dollar debts in the event of a devaluation.
The currency premium would by definition vanish if Argentina dollarized. It is true that the country premium would not vanish. But it might diminish, or become less sensitive to foreign disturbances, when the possibility of devaluation vanishes.
The interesting hypothesis in Table 1 is that under dollarization the regression coefficient on foreign interest rates would be smaller. For purposes of comparison, we look at Panama.
The hypothesis is borne out. When the U.S. fed funds rate rises 1 basis point, the Panamanian interest rate on average rises by only an estimated .43 basis points. 25 The suggested implication is that, somewhat paradoxically, Argentina might be less at the mercy of the Federal Reserve if it went on the dollar standard. But a drawback would be that increases in Argentine interest rates would bear US fingerprints more visibly from a political standpoint; the statistical fit is tighter for the dollarized country than for the currency board country.
The same pattern holds when the tests are extended to two Latin American countries with a less-firm tie to the dollar. When short-term interest rates in Brazil and Mexico are regressed against the US fed funds rate, the estimated coefficients are substantially higher, even, than they a. Standard errors are reported in paretheses. b. * indicates coefficient was significant at the 10% level, ** indicates it was significant at the 5% level, and *** indicates it was significant at the 1% level.
were for Argentina. 26 But the standard errors are also larger. It seems, unusually, as if the looser the relationship, the higher the regression coefficient. This supports the notion that the presence of exchange rate uncertainty exacerbates swings in the risk premium.
The Argentine dollarization proposal: Is it a good idea?
The blueprint from the Argentine authorities details three possible approaches to 26 Similar results regarding the behavior of interest rates in fixed vs. flexible regimes are found by Hausmann et al (1999) . The finding that interest rates in emerging markets react more than one-for-one to U.S. short-term interest rates is not new. More results and references are given in Frankel and Okongwu (1996) . Tests of monetary stability under various exchange rate regimes are found in Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry, and Wolf, 1997. (Cooperative exchange of information in the area of banking supervision is more likely, especially if U.S. banks continue to play a growing role in the Argentine banking system.)
Indeed, the United States is so wary of incurring a contingent liability, that it may refuse to enter even into a symbolic treaty designed to give a stamp of approval to the plan, for fear of creating implicit expectations of future bailouts.
Argentina could choose to dollarize unilaterally instead. Given the proven historical inability to put monetary policy to good use, this might be advantageous to Argentina even without help on seignorage or lender-of-last resort facilities, provided the loss of sovereignty is politically acceptable.
Would dollarization be beneficial to the United States? To say that the effect would be very small is true, but not helpful; the next step would be to ask what would be the effect if other countries wanted the same. The effects would start to add up; so we had better consider their 
No Single Regime is Right for All Time
The proposition that the optimal or desirable regime sometimes varies over time may be a harder "sell" than that it varies across countries. After all, such criteria as openness and income correlations are called parameters. Does that not imply some permanence? Does not a given economic structure correspond to a given optimal exchange rate regime for all time?
One answer is that parameters in fact change over time. This point becomes particularly interesting when governments deliberately change their economic structure, for example increasing regional trade integration through regional trading arrangements, or even through currency unions themselves. The endogeneity of the optimum currency area criterion is taken up in section 4.
Another answer is that recent history seems to suggest that occasional regime-switching may be unavoidable for some countries, as messy as such a conclusion must be for central bankers and theorists alike.
Exit Strategies
It is clear that a number of countries that suffered from very high inflation rates, and underwent repeated unsuccessful stabilization attempts in the 1980s, were eventually able to get the monkey off their backs with the aid of exchange rate targets --Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and
Israel. In each case the exchange-rate based stabilization was highly successful. And yet, in each case, there was enough residual inflation that the currency in subsequent years became progressively overvalued in real terms, putting pressure both on the real economy and on the financial sustainability of the exchange rate target. How to get out of such a situation gracefully is the question of exit strategies.
To say it is a question is to say it is a good topic for research, not that anyone has any very good answers to suggest, as of yet. 28 On the one hand, Argentina seems to have done well, all things considered, by sticking with a binding commitment. On the other hand, Israel seems to have done well by introducing more flexibility when the currency became overvalued. Mexico in 1994 (and now, some will say, Brazil in January 1999) seem to ended up badly by clinging to their exchange rate policies for too long.
For a certain class of high-inflation countries, one is tempted to recommend an initial peg, to break the inflationary psychology, followed a few years later by a crawl or other flexible regime to cut off overvaluation. But can this advice be right, in a model in which people are forward looking? If they know the depreciation is coming in the future, will the stabilization be credible in the present? If it is optimal for the government to incur some real pain to earn inflation-fighting credibility at the beginning, can it really then be optimal to give up that credibility after it has been earned?
Perhaps one should factor in political support as a source of variation over time in objectives. Absent public support, the mere proclamation of a fixed exchange rate arrangement does not guarantee credibility, notwithstanding the claims of the enthusiasts. This is true even if the commitment is sincerely meant on the part of the President of the Central Bank. After all, he or she can be fired. Most populations are willing to sacrifice monetary sovereignty in the name of fighting inflation only when hyperinflation is fresh in their minds. In some countries, that may be the length of one or more lifetimes (Germany and Argentina). In others, it might not survive more than a few years into single-digit inflation. Then an exit strategy might be appropriate.
The Optimum Currency Area Criterion Evolves over Time
Such parameters as openness and income correlations are not fixed for all time, but rather change, in response both to countries' fundamental policy choices and in response to exogenous factors such as declining transportation costs. Integration is increasing worldwide. Most countries have experienced a large increase in the ratio of trade to income during the postwar period. But this trend is far from having run its course.
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The extent of integration among European countries, in particular, is increasing over time, partly as a result of such measures as the removal of barriers to trade and labor mobility in 1992.
Even if countries such as the UK did not satisfy the criteria for joining the optimum currency area in the 1990s, perhaps they will in the future. This point is especially acute for new EU members such as Sweden. The long-term effect of EU accession in 1995 will be to promote Sweden's trade with other European countries. Statistical estimates using the gravity model of bilateral trade suggest that membership in the EU increases trade with its members by roughly 60 percent or more. 30 Thus Sweden is moving rightward in Figure 3 , making it more likely that it will cross the line and satisfy the OCA criterion in the future than in the past.
What about the other parameter, the degree of income correlation among members? We come now to a key point.
Income correlation surely depends on trade integration.
My hypothesis is that this relationship is positive: the more Sweden trades with the EU, the more will Swedish income be correlated with EU income. It seems likely that the incomes of U.S. states, for example, are highly correlated with each other because their economies are highly 29 Endogeneity of the degree of wage and price flexibility with respect to the exchange rate regime has received more attention than endogeneity of trade patterns. But the hope that European countries would respond to EMU by moving in the direction of more flexible labor markets, "because they will have to," shows no sign so far of being realized. Endogeneity of trade patterns seems to me more deserving of attention.
integrated. The result would be immediate in a demand-driven model (where the correlation of income depends in a simple way on the marginal propensities of the two countries to import from each other), but it could also follow in a variety of other models (e.g., productivity shocks spilling over via trade). Thus we have drawn the correlation function as upward sloping in Figure 3 .
Consider what happens when Sweden joins the EU. Not only does trade integration increase, but so does income correlation. We move up and to the right. The advantages of pegging rise and the disadvantages fall. On both scores, the country comes closer to meeting the OCA criterion than before.
The OCA Criterion Might Be Satisfied Ex Post, Even if not Ex Ante
Now consider what happens when Sweden decides to join EMU. The elimination of exchange rate uncertainty and currency transaction costs further stimulates trade with other EU members. Integration and correlation rise further. The way we have drawn Figure 3 , even though
Sweden fails the OCA criterion given its current structure of trade, a decision to go ahead and join anyway would promote trade and raise the income correlation enough to put it over the line.
It satisfies the OCA criterion ex post, even though it fails ex ante!
The relationship that we have pictured is not the only one that can come from a consideration of the endogeneity of trade patterns and income correlations. Several authors have pointed out that as trade becomes more highly integrated, countries specialize more in production; they have then gone on to argue that this greater specialization will reduce the correlation of incomes. (Their logic may be that only supply shocks matter, and that these will become less correlated due to specialization. The authors to whom we refer are not minor figures: Barry Eichengreen and Paul Krugman. 32 Their view that specialization works against common currencies and diversification of the economy works in favor of it, other things equal, goes back to Kenen. 33 While casual empiricism suggests that integration leads to higher correlations, it is certainly possible that the 31 We have drawn the correlation function as steeper than the OCA line, on the grounds that if economists disagree about whether the slope is positive or negative, then the line must be relatively steep. Obviously this logic is far from airtight.
32 "Theory and the experience of the US suggest that EC regions will become increasingly specialized, and that as they become more specialized they will become more vulnerable to region-specific shocks. Regions will, of course, be unable to respond with counter-cyclical monetary or exchange rate policy" (Krugman, 1993, p.260) . See also Eichengreen (1992, pp.14-16) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994, pp.4-5) .
33 Peter Kenen (1969) argued that regions that are highly diversified economically are better off (which is clearly true), and that such regions are better candidates to fix their currencies to those of neighbors than regions that are more specialized.
Eichengreen-Krugman view is the right one. There is no substitute for formal empiricism of the sort presented in the next section.
For the moment, note an apparent drawback to the Eichengreen-Krugman view that specialization makes countries worse candidates to share a common currency. The drawback derives merely from the logic of drawing boundaries around ever-larger geographical areas.
Stipulate that the joining of two or more regions forms a larger unit that tends to be more highly diversified as a whole than are the regions considered individually. 34 Then if an individual region is sufficiently diversified to pass the Eichengreen-Krugman test for pegging its currency to a neighbor, it follows that the larger (more diversified) unit that is thereby created will pass the test by an even wider margin, other things equal. It thus will want to peg to other neighbors, forming still larger units, and so forth. The process will continue until the entire world is on one currency. Quite a corner solution.
What if the individual regions are not sufficiently diversified to pass the EichengreenKrugman criterion to begin with? Then, under the OCA logic, they should break up into smaller currency units (say, provinces) that float against each other. But these smaller units will be even less diversified, and thus will fail the Eichengreen-Krugman criterion by a wider margin, and will thus decide to break up into still smaller units (say counties). The process of dissolution will continue until the world is down to the level of the (fully-specialized) individual. In other words, the system is unstable. There exists no interior solution that is an equilibrium. Admittedly, governments might not in practice use the OCA criterion in choosing their regime. But it is 34 Statistical estimates suggest that every one percent increase in the size of a region (holding constant income per capita) raises trade by about .7 percent, implying a fall of .3 per cent in openness. (Frankel, 1997, p.64.) disturbing to think that if governments did follow the "correct" OCA criterion, the outcome must be either a world of one currency or a world of 5 billion. This would be an egregious departure from the economist's belief in interior solutions. It doesn't sound right. The empirical work reported here is from Frankel and Rose (1998) . Its main goal is to ascertain whether income correlation depends positively on trade integration or negatively, i.e., Corr(v,s) i,j,t is the correlation between country i and country j over time span t for activity concept v. The latter is measured alternatively by various de-trended versions of real GDP, industrial production, employment, or the unemployment rate.
Trade(w) i,j,t is the log of the average bilateral trade intensity between country i and country j over time span t using trade intensity concept w. The latter is measured alternatively by bilateral export intensities, bilateral import intensities, or bilateral intensities in total trade.
(Intensity refers to the bilateral value divided by the total import or export levels of the two countries.)
The error term e i,j,t represents other determinants of bilateral income correlations.
The data set represents 21 industrial countries, annually from 1959-1993. The object is to see the sign of the slope coefficient b. It should be negative if the Eichengreen-Krugman specialization effect dominates, and positive if our hypothesis is borne out. When the activity variable is the change in GDP over four quarters, the coefficient on the intensity of total trade is .071. The Huber-White standard error is .0088. The results are highly significant, and tend to bear out our hypothesis that close trade links lead to high income correlations. All 60 combinations of activity and trade measures also give this answer. The outcome is the same regardless of the choice of time period, weighting by country size, allowance for nonlinearities or time-specific or country-specific fixed effects.
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A simple OLS regression of income correlations on trade intensity may be inappropriate.
Countries are likely deliberately to link their currencies to those of some of their most important trading partners. In doing so they lose the ability to set monetary policy independently of those neighbors, which in turn could result in an observed positive association between trade links and income links. In other words, the association could be the result of countries' application of the OCA criterion, rather than an aspect of economic structure that is invariant to exchange rate regime. To identify the effect of bilateral trade patterns on income correlations, we need exogenous determinants of bilateral trade patterns. These can be used as instrumental variables.
Our preferred set of instrumental variables includes the most basic variables of the well-known 35 The data sources and results for sixty combinations are reported in Frankel and Rose (1998) .
gravity model of trade: distance and dummy variables for common borders and common languages.
First-stage linear projections of trade intensity on these three gravity variables show the expected results: significant negative effects of distance and positive effects of common borders or common language. Instrumental variable estimates of our basic equation give estimates of b that tend to be even higher and more significant statistically than the OLS results. When the activity variable is GDP fourth-differenced, the coefficient on the intensity of total trade is +.103.
The Huber-White standard error is .015. Once again, the results are highly significant, and tend to bear out our hypothesis that close trade links lead to high income correlations. As before, the conclusion is robust with respect to choice of activity and trade measures, time period, weighting by country size, allowance for nonlinearities or time-specific or country-specific fixed effects.
Of the various other extensions we tried, one is particularly important. The BayoumiEichengreen view is that the high correlation among European countries is a result not of trade links but of European's decision to relinquish monetary independence vis-a-vis their neighbors.
If this is correct, putting the exchange-rate regime variable explicitly on the right-hand side of the equation should show the effect, and the apparent effect of the trade and geography variables should disappear. Instead, it turns out that the addition of the exchange-rate variable does not significantly alter b.
This question bears further exploration, both theoretical and empirical. But the results seem clearly to show that trade links do in practice raise income correlations. It would seem to follow that countries that undergo a gradual rise in trade integration will come gradually over time to satisfy better and better the criteria for a common currency. This effect is just one example of the more general principle that no single exchange rate regime is right for all time.
Summary of Conclusions
Three propositions are currently heard, either as predictions or prescriptions, regarding countries' choice of exchange rate regimes. On the one hand, some veterans of the currency wars yearn for a general move toward increased flexibility. On the other hand some herald a general move toward reduced flexibility, including rigid commitments via institutional arrangements that lock in fixed rates; these include currency boards or even the outright disappearance of national currencies in some parts of the world. A third view, which is rapidly becoming a new conventional wisdom, subsumes the first two: countries are increasingly finding the middle One theme of this paper is that the optimal exchange rate regime depends on the circumstances of the particular country and time. For some countries, corner solutions are indeed good options. Floating will continue to be desirable for large economies. Fixity may be desirable for very small open economies, or for those where a history of hyperinflation or the dominance of finicky global investors has rendered confidence scarce and independent monetary policy no longer usable. Providing the public is willing politically to give up monetary sovereignty, even full official dollarization may be attractive for some countries in Latin America, where interest rates currently react more than one-for-one to the U.S federal funds rate.
But another theme of this paper is that intermediate solutions are often more likely to be appropriate than corner solutions. For many countries, regimes in between the extremes of pure floating and rigid fixity will continue to be appropriate, the new conventional wisdom notwithstanding. This is true, for example, for some developing countries for whom large-scale Another dimension on which an intermediate solution is more plausible than corner solutions regards the geographic area over which it is optimal to have a common currency.
Optimum currency area criteria include the intensity of trade links and the magnitude of income correlations. Small political units that have tight economic links with their neighbors are too small to float. If the boundaries of a geographic area are drawn sufficiently large that the trade links and income links among its constituent parts are strong compared to the trade links and income links with its neighbors, then it is of the optimal size to constitute an independent currency area. Empirical results suggest that when a political unit adopts the currency of a neighbor, the creation of the monetary union over time promotes trade between the neighbors, which in turn has a positive effect on the correlation in incomes. The implication is that the optimum currency area criterion may be satisfied ex post even if it fails ex ante. This endogeneity of the criterion is another example of the general proposition that the optimal regime varies across countries and over time.
* * *
